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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, a Utah
corporation, and ALBERT
CHARBONEAU, and individual,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

vs.
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a
Nevada limited partnership,
MARK CHILTON, ROGER S.
TROUNDAY, WARD W. CHILTON,
and STEVEN R. TROUNDAY,

Case No. 890376

Defendants and
Respondents,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) .

II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether Appellants Shire Development Company Inc.

("Shire") and Albert Charboneau ("Charboneau") have standing as

joint venturers with the named purchaser under a real estate
contract to recover amounts paid by them to Respondents Frontier
Investments and its partners (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "Frontier11) for the purchase of the real property, which
payments Frontier purported to retain as liquidated damages when
Frontier forfeited the purchaser's interest in the real estate
contract*

III.
INTRODUCTION
In November, 1984, Frontier sold certain vacant land
(the "Property") in Wendover, Nevada to one Steven T. Glezos
("Glezos")

under

a

Real

Estate

Sales

thereafter, Shire and Charboneau entered

Contract.

Shortly

into an oral joint

venture agreement with Glezos to purchase the Property
Frontier.

from

Pursuant to that agreement, Shire and Charboneau paid

directly to Frontier $80,725.11 of the total of $91,725.11 paid
for the Property.

In March, 1985, a few months

after the

contract was entered into, the contract went into default and
Frontier purported to forfeit the purchaser's interest in the
Property

and

retain

the

entire

amount

paid

as

liquidated

damages.
Thereafter, in settlement of a federal court lawsuit
brought by Glezos to recover the money paid under the contract,
Frontier and Glezos entered into an agreement pursuant to which

2

Frontier
towards

settled

Glezos*

the purchase

of

claim
the

for

the

Property.

$11,000.00
In that

he

paid

agreement,

Frontier and Glezos expressly acknowledged that they were not
settling

any claims which Shire and Charboneau had

for the

$80,725.11 which they paid towards the purchase of the Property.
Shire and Charboneau then commenced this action seeking
to recover the money they paid Frontier towards purchase of the
Property.

The district court ruled on summary judgment that

Shire and Charboneau had no standing to recover the money they
paid Frontier because they had no rights in the contract.

It is

respectfully submitted that this conclusion was in error, and
that Shire and Charboneau, as joint venturers with Glezos, have
standing to recover the amounts they paid for purchase of the
Property.

Accordingly, the Summary Judgment should be reversed.

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Proceedings Below.

Shire and Charboneau commenced this action seeking to
recover the sum of $80,725.11 which they paid Frontier towards
the purchase of the Property on the ground that it would be an
unconscionable penalty to allow Frontier to keep all the funds
paid towards purchase of the Property.
In February, 1988, Frontier filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing that Shire and Charboneau had no standing to

3

assert the claims made.

The district court rejected most of the

grounds asserted by Frontier

in support of its Motion, but

nevertheless granted Frontier Summary Judgment on the basis that
Shire and Charboneau were not named parties to the contract.
The district court erroneously ruled they had not received an
oral or written assignment of any rights in the Property from
Glezos.
The court entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment on
August 4, 1989.

Shire and Charboneau filed their Notice of

Appeal on August 21, 1989.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The following undisputed facts were established by the
record:
1.

On or about October 22, 1984, Glezos, as purchaser,

entered into a written real estate contract with Frontier, as
seller, for the purchase of .841 acres of real property located
in Wendover, Nevada for a total purchase price of $126,150.00.
[R. 70-71]
2.
Glezos

Ten days later, on November 1, 1984, Frontier and

entered

into

a

second

real

estate

contract

"Contract11) which superseded the October contract.

(the

Pursuant to

the Contract, the parties agreed to the purchase of a larger
parcel

of

real

property

by

Glezos

including the original parcel.

containing

5., 997

The purchase price

Property was $765,494.00, payable in installments.

4

acres,

for the

[R. 71]

3.

Shortly after Glezos entered into the Contract, he

entered into an oral joint venture agreement with Shire and
Charboneau for the purchase of the Property pursuant to which
the

parties

agreed

to

share

the

profits

derived

from

the

Property in the same proportion as their contributions toward
the purchase of the Property.
paid

$50,725.11

and

towards the purchase.

Pursuant to this agreement, Shire

Charboneau

paid

$30,000.00

to

Frontier

Glezos paid only $11,000.00. [R. 135-136,

145, 152]
4.

The checks representing Charboneaufs and Shire's

contributions towards the joint venture were made payable to
Frontier as installment payments due under the Contract, were
drawn on Shire's checking account and were paid directly to
Frontier.

One of these checks was actually picked up in person

at Shire's corporate offices by some of Frontier's partners,
Roger Trounday, Mark Chilton and Ward Chilton [R. 136]
5.

An installment payment on the Contract in the sum of

$83,744.00 due on or about February

20, 1985 was not paid.

Consequently, Frontier elected to and did forfeit the Contract
and purported to retain all funds previously paid as liquidated
damages.

[R. 72]
6.

Glezos then brought an action against Frontier in

federal court to recover all amounts paid for purchase of the
Property.

Shire and Charboneau filed a motion to intervene on

the basis that they were entitled to recover all but $11,000.00

5

of the payments made to Frontier.

Prior to resolution of the

motion,

agreement

Glezos

Charboneau,

entered

into

recognizing

his

an

joint

venture

with

Shire

and

with

Shire

and

Charboneau and agreeing that they were entitled to share in any
proceeds of a settlement or judgment in the same proportion as
their contributions

for the purchase of the Property.

The

agreement also required written approval of a majority of the
joint venturers to any settlement and that Shire and Charboneau
withdraw their Motion to Intervene. [R. 145 and 148-149] A copy
of the agreement is attached hereto as Addendum
7.

Thereafter,

settlement
action.

discussions
Both

Frontier's
settlement.

with

Glezos

partners,
Shire

Glezos

and
asked

and

and

reference
Respondent
Shire

Charboneau

to

lf

AM.

Frontier
to

the

Ward

settlement proposed by Glezos and Frontier.

federal

Chilton,

agree

refused

entered

to
to

a

agree

into
court

one

of

proposed
to

the

Without informing

Shire and Charboneau, Glezos and Frontier then entered into a
written settlement agreement, which Frontier well knew Shire and
Charboneau did not approve or have knowledge of, and the federal
court action was dismissed.

The settlement agreement between

Glezos and Frontier expressly recognized that they were only
settling

whatever

claims

Glezos

had

with

respect

to

the

$11,000.00 he contributed towards purchase of the Property.

The

agreement did not purport to settle whatever claims Shire and
Charboneau had with respect to the $80,72 5.11 they contributed

6

towards the purchase of the Property.

[R. 73, 136-137, 156]

A

copy of the agreement is attached hereto as Addendum "B".

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

A seller who forfeits a buyer's interest under a

real estate contract is only entitled to retain amounts paid
under the contract if the amounts bear a reasonable relationship
to the seller's actual damages.

There is admittedly a question

of fact in the case at bar as to whether the amounts retained by
Frontier constituted an unenforceable penalty.
2.

Even though Shire and Charboneau

are not named

parties to the Contract, they nevertheless have standing to
recover the amounts they paid Frontier because they were joint
venturers with Glezos for the purchase of the Property.

There

is clearly sufficient evidence in the record from which a finder
of fact could conclude that Frontier had actual knowledge that
Glezos had formed a joint venture for purchase of the Property.
In this

regard,

the Contract

allowed

interest without Frontier's consent.

Glezos

to

assign

his

Property may be acquired

and owned jointly by a joint venture although the title is in
the name of only one of the co-venturers.

Property acquired

with joint venture funds is deemed joint venture property in the
absence of a contrary intention.

7

The joint venture agreement

was not required to be in writing.
agreement

between

Glezos,

Shire

and

In any event, a written
Charboneau

does

exist

recognizing the joint venture.
3. Shire and Charboneau are the only parties with any
possible right to bring this equitable action to recover the
amounts they paid to Frontier on the Contract.

If they are

precluded from doing so, Frontier will receive a windfall.

VI.

ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review.

It is well settled that in considering an appeal of a
Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences must
be viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant and no
deference is to be given to the trial court's conclusions of
law.

Summary judgment was not proper in this case because

utilizing

those

standards

material

requiring resolution at trial.
City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 946

issues

of

fact

existed

See, e.g., Seftel v. Capitol
(Utah App. 1989); Payne ex rel

Pavne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 187-188 (Utah 1987); Scharf v.
B.M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Guardian State
Bank v. Humphries, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988) .

8

B.

Issues of Fact Exist As to Whether Frontier Can

Retain All Payments Made,

Frontier purported to retain the $91,725.11 paid on the
Contract

in

contained

reliance

therein.

upon

a

Although

liquidated
such

damages

provisions

are

provision
sometimes

enforceable, a seller is not permitted to retain all amounts
paid

under

a

contract

where

the

amount

retained

bears

reasonable relationship to the seller's actual damages,

no

Allen

v. Kingdom, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986); Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d
1082 (Utah 1983); Haromv v. Sawyer, 654 P.2d 1022 (Nev. 1982).
Frontier did not seek summary judgment on the basis that there
was no factual

issue as to whether the $91,725.11 which

it

retained had any reasonable relation to its damages, if any.
Admittedly, material issues of fact exist in that regard.

C.

Shire and Charboneau Have Standing to Maintain This

Action.

In the court below, Frontier

argued

that

Shire

and

Charboneau had no standing to recover amounts they paid Frontier
for purchase of the Property because they were not named parties
to the Contract between Frontier, as seller, and Glezos, as
purchaser.

Shire and Charboneau don't have any quarrel with the

general proposition that a stranger to a contract cannot bring

9

suit on that contract.
the case at bar.

However, that is not the situation in

It is simply not open to dispute, at least for

purposes of Frontier's Summary Judgment Motion, that a joint
venture was formed between Glezos, Shire and Charboneau shortly
after Glezos entered into the Contract with Frontier pursuant to
which the joint venture was purchasing the Property.

See, Bowen

v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
The Contract with Frontier allowed assignment of Glezos1
interest without consent.

Paragraph 8 provided:

Nominee or Assignee. Any nominee designated
by buyer and any assignee of the buyer shall
succeed to any and may exercise all of buyer's
rights and immunities, and upon such designation of
nominee or assignee, buyer's nominee or assignee
shall be substituted as buyer herein.
Paragraph 9 in turn provided:
Benefits. This contract shall inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto
and their respective successors, heirs, executors,
administrators, assigns and nominees.
As joint venturers for the purchase of the Property,
Shire and Charboneau are by operation of law assignees of the
purchaser.

They are therefore entitled to recover amounts paid

by them to Frontier, subject to whatever defenses Frontier has
on the contract.1

See, Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P. 2d 464 (Utah

Because Glezos was one of the joint venturers in the joint
venture and therefore still had an interest in the Contract, Glezos
would ordinarily be a necessary party. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P. 2d
758 (Utah 1984). However, it was not necessary to join Glezos in
this case because Frontier had already settled with him.
10

1962)

Essex v. Ryan. 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind.App. 1983); Reich v.

Kimnach. 216 S.E.2d 58 (Vir. 1975).
Tomino v. Greater Park City Co. , 570 P. 2d 698
1977) is closely on point.

(Utah

In that case, the plaintiff, who was

an assignee of the purchaser under a contract to acquire certain
real property in Park City, sought return of partial payments
made.
the

The seller/defendant asserted it was entitled to retain

payments

contract.

under

This

the

Court

liquidated
upheld

a

damage

judgment

provision

in

the

in

of

the

favor

assignee, rejecting defendant's theory of forfeiture.
Frontier asserted below that it had no notice of Shire's
and Charboneau's

interest

in the Property and therefore any

assignment was not effective.

The facts demonstrate otherwise.

First, all but $11,000.00 of the payments made for purchase of
the Property were paid to Frontier by Shire and Charboneau on
Shire checks.
payment

from

In fact, on one occasion, Frontier picked up a
Shire

at

Shire's

offices

in

Salt

Lake

City.

Second, it is beyond dispute that long before Frontier secretly
settled with Glezos in the federal court action to avoid the
fact that Shire and Charboneau would not agree to the proposed
settlement, Frontier was fully informed of the extent and nature
of Shire's and Charboneau's interest in the joint venture.
fact,

the

Release

between

Frontier

and

Glezos

In

specifically

acknowledged that the settlement only resolved Glezos' claim on
the $11,000.00 he paid Frontier and not any claim that Share and

11

Charboneau had arising out of their payments to Frontier,

The

Release provided in part:
Glezos hereby releases Frontier from all
claims relating to the $11,000,00 he personally
provided for payments to Frontier under the
disputed real estate purchase agreements, Glezos
does not intend by giving such Release, to release
or affect in any way, favorably or unfavorably, any
claims which Albert Charboneau or Shire Development
Inc, may have against Frontier relating to funds
either of them provided for payment to Frontier
under
the
disputed
real
estate
agreements,
[Emphasis Added]
The district court apparently believed that the fact
that Glezos agreed to a joint venture for the purchase of the
Property was not sufficient to constitute an assignment which
would give Shire and Charboneau rights in the Contract even
though the court expressly rejected Frontier's assertion that
any assignment would have had to be in writing.
16]

[R. 187, at p.

It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in this

regard.
The fact that the Contract was only

in the name of

Glezos and the joint venture was never substituted as the named
purchaser is not controlling.

Property may be acquired and

owned jointly by a joint venture although the title is in the
name of only one of the co-venturers.
Ventures,

Section

17.

4 6 Am Jur 2d. Joint

Furthermore, property

acquired

with

partnership or joint venture funds is deemed partnership or
joint venture property in the absence of a contrary intention,
H. Reuschlein and W. Gregory, Agency and Partnership, Section

12

214

(1979) ; J. Crane and A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership,

Section 37(c) at p. 207 (1968); 46 Am Jur 2d, Joint Ventures,
Section 40; Paganucchi v. Kalpouzos, 178 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal.
1947) •

As the district court ruled below, a joint venture

agreement for the purchase of real property is not required to
be in writing.
1975)-2

Ellingson v. Sloan, 527 P.2d 1100 (Ariz.App.

Once the joint venture is proven, the joint venturer

holding title or an interest in the real property holds it in
trust for the other venturers,

Harestad v. Weitzel, 536 P. 2d

522 (Ore, 1975).
The undisputed evidence before the district court was
that after Glezos executed the Contract, he entered into the
oral joint venture agreement with Shire and Charboneau to
purchase the Property.

Shire and Charboneau then paid all

further payments of the purchase price directly to Frontier.
Glezos later signed an agreement after Shire and Charboneau
filed their Motion to Intervene in the federal court action
expressly recognizing the joint venture for the purchase of the
Property, that Charboneau and Shire had contributed money for
the purchase of the Property, and that they were entitled to
share in any recovery

of the purchase price

in the same

Even if the joint venture agreement were required to be in
writing, Frontier could not assert the statute of frauds because
it was not a party to the joint venture agreement. Family Finance
Fund v. Abraham, 657 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1982); Harmon v. Tanner Motor
Tours, 377 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1963).
13

percentage

as

their

respective

purchase of the Property.

contributions

towards

the

The agreement also provided that the

federal court action could only be settled based upon the
majority approval of Glezos, Shire and Charboneau,
the

settlement

Frontier

agreement

by which

they

entered
settled

into
the

between

federal

Moreover,
Glezos

court

and

lawsuit

specifically acknowledged that they were only settling Glezos1
claim for the $11,000,00 he paid towards the purchase of the
Property and that they were not settling any claim that Shire
and Charboneau had for the money they paid towards purchase of
the Property.

Under these facts, it simply makes no sense to

preclude Shire and Charboneau from maintaining an action to
recover the amounts they paid to Frontier under their joint
venture for the purchase of the Property.
Finally, Shire and Charboneau do not seek by this action
to enforce any contractual rights of Glezos. Rather, they seek
equitable relief from the unconscionable penalty provided by the
strict terms of the Contract which allows Frontier to keep all
payments which Shire and Charboneau made.

Who better to seek

recovery of amounts paid in a forfeiture case than the parties
who paid the money?

In fact, unless Shire and Charboneau have

standing to assert that claim, then Frontier stands to receive
a substantial windfall because Glezos has already given up any
claims that he has against Frontier when he settled with respect
to the $11,000.00 he paid for the Property.

14

CONCLUSION

Shire

and

Charboneau

paid

$80,725.11

Frontier for the purchase of the Property-

directly

to

There is clearly

sufficient evidence in the record from which the finder of fact
could

conclude

that

Frontier had

knowledge

that Glezos had

entered into a joint venture with Shire and Charboneau for the
purchase of the Property as he was permitted by the Contract to
do.

Thus, Shire and Charboneau have standing to maintain this

equitable action to recover their payments.

To hold otherwise

would mean that no one has any right to maintain an action
against Frontier to recover the penalty and would result in an
unconscionable windfall to Frontier.
It is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judgment
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
DATED this 01 — d a y of October, 1989.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
N

) JI

Mitchell
js shireapp\brief
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed four
(4) copies of the within Brief of Appellants to the following
party by depositing the same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid,
this 3 1 —

da

Y

of

October, 1989:

David A. Greenwood, Esq.
Marvin D. Bagley, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys for Respondent
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

AGREEMENT

This Agreement is made and entered into this 25th day of
September, 1986, by and between STEVEN T. GLEZOS ("Glezos") and
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation ("Shire") and BERT
CHARBONEAU ("Charboneau") by and through their respective
attorneys with reference to the following facts,
WHEREAS, Glezos has commences a legal action in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, entitled:

Steven T. Glezos, Plantiff, v. Frontier

Investments, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 85C-1004G (the
"pending action"), in which action Glezos is seeking to recover
the sum of approximately $90,000.00 paid to Frontier Investments
for the purchase of certain real property located m

the State

of Nevada (the "property"); and
WHEREAS, Charboneau contributed $30,000.00 for the
purchase of the property and Shire and Glezos also contributed
various sums for the purchase of the property; and
WHEREAS, Shire, Charboneau and Utah Cross]ng Ltd. have
filed a Motion in the pending action seeking leave to

intervene

as Plaintiffs to assert a right to all or a portion of any funds
recovered from Frontier Investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree as follows:
1.

Glezos, Shire and Charboneau are entitled to

share in

the proceeds of any judgment or settlement obtained from
Frontier Investments in the pending action, after deducting

EXHIBIT A
000148

pending action, m

the same percentage as their respective

contributions toward the purchase of the property bear to the
total amount paid towards purchase of the property.
Charboneau's share of any settlement or judgment, based upon his
contribution of $30,000.00, shall be paid to him as soon as
possible after receipt of funds fiom Frontier Investments.

The

remainder of the funds received from Frontier Investments shall
be placed in an J riterest-bearmg account requiring both the
signatures of counsel for both Shire and Glezos for any
withdrawals pending an agreement between Shire and Glezos for
the release of such funds. '
2.

Any settlement of the pending action by GLezos shall

require written approval from any two of Glezos, Shire and
Charboneau.
3.

Shire and Charboneau shall cause the Motion to

Intervene an the pending action to be withdrawn.
4.

The undersigned attorneys represent and warrant that

they have the full right and authority from their respective
clients to execute this Agreement on their behalf.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement the day and date first above written.

WARDS,^-GARDINER & BROWN

Step;
Attorn

>toker
for Steven T. Glezos
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BURBI

MITCHELL

Ste(jbJffl\B.
Mitchell
A t t o r n e y s f o r S h i r e and
Charboneau
dd5401a

"EXHIBIT E
(Attached to and forming a part of the Real
Property Purchase Agreement, dated October
13, 1987, between Frontier Investments, as
Seller, and Steven T. Glezos, as Buyer.)
RELEASE OF CLAIMS
AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE
THIS RELEASE OF CLAIMS AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE ("Agreement")
is made and entered into as of the
day of November, 1987,
by and b e t w e e n FRONTIER
I N V E S T M E N T S , a Nevada limited
partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "Frontier"), and STEVEN
T. GLEZOS, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
(hereinafter referred to as "Glezos").
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, Frontier and Glezos entered into that certain Real
Property Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement")
dated
October 13, 1987, for the purpose of settling the dispute between
them which is the subject of Civil No. 85C-10046 (the "Action")
filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah; and
WHEREAS, Section 1,5 of the Purchase Agreement requires that
the Buyer release the Seller from certain claims and covenant not
to sue the Seller, as hereinafter set forth;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
promises
contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration, Frontier and Glezos agree as follows:
1.
Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement,
Frontier shall perform its obligations to Glezos pursuant to the
terms of the Purchase Agreement.
2.
Glezos, for himself and all persons claiming by,
through, or under him, does hereby release, acquit, and discharge
F r o n t i e r , and all of Frontier's
affiliated
entities,
corporations, partnerships, officers, directors, shareholders,
agents, partners, attorneys, employees, and representatives of
any nature, and their successors, heirs, and assigns, and each of
them from claims as follows:
(a)
In the Action, Glezos asserted damage claims of over
$90,000 relating to purchase agreements for real property in
Wendover, Nevada.
Glezos represents to Frontier that of the

EXHIBIT B

mouthy

pdid

to f r o n t i e r

u n d e r the d i s p u t e d

contracts,

o n l

Y

$11,000

came from the personal funds of Glezos, and that the remainder
came either from funds of Albert Charboneau or from funds
borrowed by Shire Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, from
Moore Financial with guarantees from C.N. Zundel and Glezos.
(b)
Glezos hereby releases Frontier from all claims
relating to the $11,000 he personally provided for payments to
Frontier under the disputed real estate purchase agreements,
Glezos does nor intend by giving such release to release or
effect in any way, favorably or unfavorably, any claims which
Aloert Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. may have against
Frontier relating to funds either of them provided for payment to
Frontier under the disputed real estate agreements.
By
mentioning the potential claims of Albert Charboneau and Shire
Development, Inc. in this release, Glezos does not intend to
enhance or strengthen those claims in any way or to create claims
if none exist.
Glezos does, however, specifically reserve the
right, in his sole discretion, to assign to Albert Charboneau
and/or Shire Development Inc. any claims he asserted in the
Action relating to funds provided by Albert Charboneau or Shire
Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier under the real estate
purchase agreements disputed in the Action.
By signing this
document, Glezos acknowledges that Frontier does not intend to
enhance or strengthen any potential claims of Albert Charboneau
or Shire Development, Inc. relating to the subject matter of the
Action or to create claims if none exist.
(c) Although Glezos reserves the right to assign to Albert
Charboneau and/or Shire Development, Inc. any claims Glezos
asserted in the Action relating to funds provided by Albert
Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier
under the real estate purchase agreements disputed in the Action,
Glezos hereby covenants that he personally will not again sue
Frontier or any of the other parties named as defendants in the
Action for claims relating to the subject matter of the Action or
which arose prior to the date of this Agreement.
This covenant
not to sue is personal to Glezos and is nor. intended to in any
way impair the rights, if any, of Albert Charboneau or Shire
Development, Inc. if Glezos assigns claims to either or both of
them relating to funds they provided for payment to Frontier
under the disputed real estate purchase agreements.
3 . The parties hereto warrant and agree in executing this
Release of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue that they have relied
on their own judgment, belief and knowledge and not on the
representations or statements made by any of the parties released
or anyone representing them, except such representations as are
set forth in the Purchase Agreement.
4.
The reservation by Glezos of the alleged claims of
Albert Charboneau and Shire Development, Inc. against Frontier
shall not for any purpose be deemed or argued to be an admission
of responsibility or an acknowledgement of the accuracy of any
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allegations made by Albert Charboneau/ Shire Development, Inc.
or Glezos.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF Glezos has executed this
Agreement as of the day and year first abpve written.

/I
££±££1
S t e v e h T. Gl£2>cfs

>

Release

